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A ZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC GAME WITH COMPACT ACTION SETS AND NO
ASYMPTOTIC VALUE
GUILLAUME VIGERAL
Abstract. We give an example of a zero-sum stochastic game with four states, compact action sets
for each player, and continuous payoff and transition functions, such that the discounted value does not
converge as the discount factor tends to 0, and the value of the n−stage game does not converge as n
goes to infinity.
1. Introduction
Two person zero-sum stochastic games have been widely studied since Shapley introduced them in [26].
They model interactions repeated in discrete time between two players with opposite interests. The state
of nature evolves as a function of the current state and of the actions chosen by each player, and determines
which zero-sum game the players are facing at each time period. Hence, the actions of the players have an
influence both on the payoff today and on the law of the state of nature tomorrow.
There are several ways of evaluating the payoff of such a stochastic game. For any integer n ∈ N, one
defines the n−stage game for which Player 1 (resp. Player 2) maximizes (resp. minimizes) his average
gain on the first n stages. For any λ ∈]0, 1], one defines the λ-discounted game1 for which Player 1 (resp.
Player 2) maximizes (resp. minimizes) his λ−discounted payoff. Some of the main questions in the theory
of zero-sum stochastic games are related to the asymptotic behavior of the values of these games as players
grow more and more patient:
• Does the value of the n−stage game converge as n tends to infinity ?
• Does the value of the λ−discounted game converge as λ tends to 0 ?
• Are the two limits equal ?
When the answers to these three questions are positive, the game is said to have an asymptotic value. A
nice explanation of why the asymptotic value should exist for games regular enough is the following [28].
An n−stage game can be seen as a game played in the time interval [0, 1], where the payoff is ∫ 1
0
gt, and
in which the players only moves at time kn . Similarly, in a λ-discounted game, they only play at time λ,
λ + λ(1 − λ), and so on. As n goes to infinity and λ goes to 0, these games can thus be viewed as some
time discretizations of an hypothetic game played in continuous time on [0, 1], and thus the values should
converge to the value of this ”limit game”.
Stochastic games were first studied in the case of a finite number of states and when each player has
only finitely many actions. Existence and characterization of the values for a fixed λ or n is due to Shapley
[26] and relies on von Neumann’s minmax theorem [17] as well as Banach’s fixed point theorem. In this
framework, asymptotic value was established first for recursive [11] and absorbing games [12], then in
general (see [5, 6] for the original proof using Tarski-Seidenberg’s Theorem, or [19] for a recent proof
involving linear programming).
Since minmax theorems also hold true for games with compact action sets and continuous payoffs [27],
the values exist [14] for fixed n or λ for games with finitely many states, compact action sets for each
player, and continuous payoff and transitions. In this framework, asymptotic value was established for
recursive [29, 31] and absorbing [24, 31] games , and was conjectured to hold true in general [28].
Let us mention that the existence of an asymptotic value was established in the framework of Markov
decision processes and dynamic programming [2, 3, 4, 10, 21] ; for games with incomplete information
[1, 9, 15, 24] ; as well as for some stochastic games with incomplete information [20, 22, 23, 25].
In this paper we answer by the negative to the conjecture in [28] by constructing a game with four
states, compact action sets, and continuous payoff and transitions, whose values do not converge as n
This research was supported by grant ANR-10-BLAN 0112 (France).
1In which the future has weight 1 − λ ; we warn the reader that in the literature the opposite convention δ = 1− λ is often
used.
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tends to infinity or λ tends to 0. Surprisingly, it is possible to construct a compact game in which Player
1 can guarantee a payoff of 1 in any 102k−stage game, while Player 2 can guarantee a payoff of −1 in
any 102k+1−stage game. The idea of the counterexample is to construct transition functions that are
continuous but oscillate infinitely often. These oscillations of the transition functions yield oscillations -
and thus divergence - of the values.
The paper is structured as follows. The first section gives the model of compact stochastic games
and define discounted and finitely repeated values. The next section is the main one in which some
counterexamples are constructed: first we give some examples in which the discounted value diverges, then
we show that the value of the n−stage game diverges as well for some of these examples. The last section
gives some concluding remarks as well as some open questions.
2. Model
A compact two person zero-sum stochastic game Γ is defined by a finite state space Ω, compact metric
action spaces I and J for Player 1 and 2 (we will denote the mixed actions sets of Player 1 and Player 2
X = ∆(I) and Y = ∆(J), respectively2 ), a jointly continuous real bounded payoff g on I × J × Ω and a
jointly continuous transition ρ from I × J × Ω to ∆(Ω). When I and J are finite the game is said to be
finite.
The game is played in discrete time. The initial state ω1 ∈ Ω is known by both players. At stage t,
given the state ωt, the players independently choose mixed moves xt ∈ X and yt ∈ Y . The stage actions
it and jt are drawn according to xt and yt respectively. The stage payoff is gt = g(it, jt, ωt), the new state
ωt+1 is selected according to ρ(it, jt, ωt), and (it, jt, ωt+1) is announced to the players.
We are mainly interested in discounted games: for any discount factor λ ∈]0, 1], the λ-discounted game
with initial state ω1 is denoted Γλ(ω1); in this game Player 1 (resp. Player 2) maximizes (resp. minimizes)
the expectation of
∑∞
t=1 λ(1 − λ)t−1gt. The game Γλ(ω1) has a value denoted by vλ(ω1), and one proves
(see [26] in the finite case and [14] in the compact one) that the function vλ : Ω → R is the only fixed
point of the following equation:
f(ω) = min
Y
max
X
{
λg(x, y, ω) + (1− λ)Eρ(x,y,ω)f(·)
}
(1)
= max
X
min
Y
{
λg(x, y, ω) + (1− λ)Eρ(x,y,ω)f(·)
}
,(2)
where g and ρ are bilinearly extended to X×Y , and the permutation of min and max is possible according
to Sion’s theorem[27].
The following lemma gives an interesting sufficient condition for a function to be equal to vλ.
Definition 1. A mixed action x ∈ X (resp. y ∈ Y ) is equalizing for the function f in Γλ(ω) if for every
y ∈ Y (resp. every x ∈ X),
f(ω) = λg(x, y, ω) + (1− λ)Eρ(x,y,ω)f(·).
Lemma 2. Let λ ∈]0, 1] and assume that there exists a function f such that for any state ω, both players
have an equalizing action in Γλ(ω). Then f = vλ.
Proof. Such an f is a fixed point of (1) and (2), and vλ is the unique fixed point of these equations. 
The finitely repeated stochastic game with horizon n and initial state ω1 is the game in which Player 1
(resp. Player 2) maximizes (resp. minimizes) the expectation of
∑n
t=1
1
ngt. Its value is denoted by vn(ω1).
A compact stochastic game is said to have an asymptotic value if vλ and vn converge (as λ goes to 0
and n to infinity respectively) and if the limits are the same.
In the next section we construct a compact stochastic game such that neither vλ nor vn converges.
Hence there exists a compact stochastic game with no asymptotic value.
3. Main section
The main result of the paper is:
Theorem 3. There exists a stochastic game with 4 states, in which the action sets are real intervals, the
payoff and transition functions are continuous, and for which neither vλ nor vn does converge.
The remainder of this section is dedicated to the proof of this theorem.
2For a compact metric space K, ∆(K) denotes the set of Borel probabilities on K, endowed with the weak-⋆ topology.
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3.1. The intuition behind the construction. Before going to the explicit construction of a counterex-
ample we give some intuition about it and exhibit a subclass of compact games that is likely to contain a
counterexample (if such a counterexample exists). We would like for this class to be as small as possible,
in order to be more likely to find a precise counterexample within.
First, recall that a compact absorbing game has an asymptotic value [24], so in any counterexample
there must be at least two nonabsorbing states, and we consider the simplest case in which there are exactly
two. Since in any compact stochastic game vλ(·) converge for at least two initial starting states[13, 18],
there must be at least four states. To make things simpler we may as well assume that the states for which
vλ(·) converges are absorbing, with different payoffs (else our game would be equivalent to a three states
game), say −1 and 1.
We also remark that, in compact games, it is the transitions functions, rather than the payoff functions,
that are most likely be a source of oscillations of the values vλ. A small variation of g induces a small
variation of vλ; it is not the case for small variations of ρ. So, once again to simplify as much as possible,
we assume that the payoff does not depend on the actions played by the player. Since compact recursive
games have an asymptotic value [29], the payoff in the two nonabsorbing states must be different, say 1
and −1.
It remains to understand which transition functions are likely to be problematic. First of all, we argue
that under optimal play in Γλ, the absorption probability in each stage should be of the order of λ. Indeed,
if it was much smaller than λ, then absorption would happen when the game has almost ended (that is,
when the remaining part of the discounted payoff is negligible), so the absorbing states would be irrelevant
and we might as well remove them. This would give us less than four states and thus an asymptotic value.
On the other hand, if it was much greater than λ, absorption would occur almost immediately and the
same play would give the same payoff for all small λ.
Similarly, we claim that the order of transition from one nonabsorbing state to the other should be on
the order of λα, for some α in ]0, 1[: if smaller it would almost never happen before absorption ; and if
higher it would happen so often that the two states would be essentially the same, leaving us with a three
states game and an asymptotic value.
Before considering compact games, we are first going to briefly study some finite games having all these
features, to understand why vλ converge in the finite case and might not in the compact one. In fact, it
turns out that such a game was already studied3 by Bewley and Kohlberg ([7] page 120). We make the
following slight generalization4: consider the following family of finite stochastic games, where p∗+ and p
∗
−
are two parameters in [0, 1].
• There are two nonabsorbing states ω+ and ω−, and two absorbing states 1∗ and −1∗.
• Both players have two pures actions, Stay and Quit.
• The payoff in each state is independent of the actions: it is 1 in ω+ and 1∗ ; −1 in ω− and −1∗.
• The transitions are given by the following matrices:
ω+ Stay Quit
Stay ω+ ω−
Quit ω− p+1∗ + (1 − p∗+)ω+
ω− Stay Quit
Stay ω− ω+
Quit ω+ p−−1∗ + (1− p∗−)ω−
Calculations show that:
• lim vλ = v with v(ω+) = v(ω−) =
√
p∗+−
√
p∗−√
p∗++
√
p∗−
.
• Optimal mixed actions in Γλ are given, for k ∈ {+,−}, by xλ(ωk) = yλ(ωk) ≈
√
λ√
p∗
k
as λ goes to 0
(we identify a mixed action with the probability assigned to Q).
Recall that in any one-shot zero-sum game, if an optimal action of a player is completely mixed, any
optimal action of the other player is equalizing. Thus, since both xλ and yλ are completely mixed, they
are both equalizing in Γλ.
Taking the mixed extension of this finite game we get a compact game Γc. The (now pure) action
xλ and yλ are optimal in Γ
c
λ. Since we want to discuss the influence of the parameters of the game on
the transitions under optimal play, it is convenient to relabel the actions so that the optimal action of a
3Interestingly, this game was, at the time, a potential example of a finite game with no uniform value. In their example the
payoff does depend on the chosen actions but this is irrelevant as it won’t change the asymptotics of the optimal play.
4Their example is the particular case of p∗+ = p
∗
−
= 1.
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player in Γλ depends only on λ and not on p
∗
+ and p
∗
−. For any nonabsorbing ω, it can be shown that
xλ(ωk) = yλ(ωk) is decreasing for λ small enough. Hence, by some suitable change of variables for the
actions of each player in each state we get a compact game such that the stationary strategy λ in each
state is optimal (and equalizing) for each player. We have thus constructed a compact game such that:
• There are two nonabsorbing states ω+ and ω−, and two absorbing states 1∗ and −1∗.
• The set of actions of each player is [0, 1].
• In each state, for each player, the pure action λ is equalizing in Γλ for λ small enough.
• ρ(ω−|i, j, ω+) ≈
√
i+
√
j√
p∗+
; ρ(ω+|i, j, ω−) ≈
√
i+
√
j√
p∗−
; ρ(1∗|i, j, ω+) ≈
√
i
√
j
p∗+
; ρ(−1∗|i, j, ω−) ≈
√
i
√
j
p∗−
.
• v(ω+) = v(ω−) =
√
p∗+−
√
p∗−√
p∗++
√
p∗−
=
1−
√
p∗−
p∗
+
1+
√
p∗−
p∗
+
.
While these games are compact games, there are very specific ones since they are (up to a change
of variables) mixed extensions of finite games. In particular the transitions functions are linear (up to
a change of variables), and this is what entails the convergence of vλ. A natural idea is to use the
additional freedom in general compact games with interval action sets to construct a similar game such
that ρ(ω−|i, j, ω+) =
√
i+
√
j√
p∗+(i,j)
(where p∗+ is no longer a constant but a function of i and j), and similar
formulas for the other transitions. If
p∗−
p∗+
is slowly oscillating between two positive constants(which could
not happen, by linearity, in the finite case), we expect that the value vλ also oscillates and thus does not
converge.
Because of this discussion, in the following we will only consider compact games played in pure (and
not mixed) actions. This is very convenient since it yields easier computations. Of course in general there
is no reason for the values vn and vλ to exist for a game played in pure actions; however in the following
we show how to construct a game for which the values exist but do not converge.
3.2. A class of compact games. As the last section motivates us to do, let us consider the class G of
compact stochastic games satisfying the following properties:
a) There are two nonabsorbing states ω+ and ω−, and two absorbing states 1∗ and −1∗.
b) The action set of each player (denoted by I and J respectively) is the interval5
[
0, 116
]
.
c) The payoff depends only of the state: for all actions i and j, g(i, j, ω+) = g(i, j, 1
∗) = 1 and
g(i, j, ω−) = g(i, j,−1∗) = −1.
d) The transition probability ρ is (jointly) continuous, and for all actions i and j, ρ(−1∗|i, j, ω+) =
ρ(1∗|i, j, ω−) = 0.
e) In each nonabsorbing state and for each player, the pure action λ is equalizing in the discounted
game Γλ. That is, for each λ ∈
]
0, 116
]
, and for each i ∈ I and j ∈ J , the discounted value vλ
satisfies
vλ(ω+) = λ+ (1− λ)
[
p∗+(λ, j) + p+(λ, j)vλ(ω−) + (1− p∗+(λ, j)− p+(λ, j))vλ(ω+)
]
(3)
vλ(ω+) = λ+ (1− λ)
[
p∗+(i, λ) + p+(i, λ)vλ(ω−) + (1− p∗+(i, λ)− p+(i, λ))vλ(ω+)
]
(4)
vλ(ω−) = −λ+ (1 − λ)
[−p∗−(λ, j) + p−(λ, j)vλ(ω+) + (1− p∗−(λ, j)− p−(λ, j))vλ(ω−)](5)
vλ(ω−) = −λ+ (1 − λ)
[−p∗−(i, λ) + p−(i, λ)vλ(ω+) + (1− p∗−(i, λ)− p−(i, λ))vλ(ω−)] .(6)
We remark that to define a game in G one only need to specify the four functions
p∗+(i, j) := ρ(1
∗|i, j, ω+)
p+(i, j) := ρ(ω−|i, j, ω+)
p∗−(i, j) := ρ(−1∗|i, j, ω−)
p−(i, j) := ρ(ω+|i, j, ω−)
since necessarily ρ(ω+|i, j, ω+) = 1− p∗+(i, j)− p+(i, j) and ρ(ω−|i, j, ω−) = 1− p∗−(i, j)− p−(i, j).
Also we observe that equations (3) to (6) are characterizations of vλ: any function wλ : {ω+, ω−} → R
satisfying the same system must be the discounted value of the game according to Lemma 2. Also remark
that it implies that the discounted games have a value in pure strategies.
We first establish Theorem 3 for discounted values:
Theorem 4. There exists a game in G such that vλ does not converge as λ goes to 0.
5For reasons that will become clear later (division by 1− λ) it is better not to take I = [0, 1] but a smaller intervall.
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The idea of the construction of such an example is to think of the family {vλ}λ∈]0, 116 ] as a parameter
of the game, and of the transition functions as unknowns, rather than the opposite. The construction is
done in three steps: first, for any family vλ we identify good candidates p
∗
+, p
∗
−, p+, p− that may lead to
value vλ in Γλ. These candidate functions are in general neither in [0, 1] nor continuous ; but in a second
step we show that when it is the case they indeed define a game in G with value vλ. Finally, we find a
family vλ that does not converge as λ goes to 0, but such that the constructed candidates p
∗
+, p
∗
−, p+, p−
have the required regularity.
So let us fix a family vλ and try to find suitable functions p
∗
+, p
∗
−, p+, and p−. By simplifying a bit
equations (3) to (6), and replacing λ by µ in (4) and (6) one gets the following system (where λ and µ are
in
]
0, 116
]
while i and j are in
[
0, 116
]
):
vλ(ω+) =
λ+ (1− λ) [p∗+(λ, j) + p+(λ, j)vλ(ω−)]
λ+ (1− λ)p∗+(λ, j) + (1− λ)p+(λ, j)
(7)
vµ(ω+) =
µ+ (1− µ) [p∗+(i, µ) + p+(i, µ)vµ(ω−)]
µ+ (1− µ)p∗+(i, µ) + (1− µ)p+(i, µ)
(8)
vλ(ω−) =
−λ+ (1− λ) [−p∗−(λ, j) + p−(λ, j)vλ(ω+)]
λ+ (1− λ)p∗−(λ, j) + (1− λ)p−(λ, j)
(9)
vµ(ω−) =
−µ+ (1 − µ) [−p∗−(i, µ) + p−(i, µ)vµ(ω+)]
µ+ (1− µ)p∗−(i, µ) + (1− µ)p−(i, µ)
(10)
In particular taking j = µ in (7) and i = λ in (8) one gets, for each couple λ, µ in
]
0, 116
]
, the system

vλ(ω+) =
λ+(1−λ)[p∗+(λ,µ)+p+(λ,µ)vλ(ω−)]
λ+(1−λ)p∗+(λ,µ)+(1−λ)p+(λ,µ)
vµ(ω+) =
µ+(1−µ)[p∗+(λ,µ)+p+(λ,µ)vµ(ω−)]
µ+(1−µ)p∗+(λ,µ)+(1−µ)p+(λ,µ)
.
It is convenient to denote s(λ) = vλ(ω+)+vλ(ω−)2 and d(λ) =
vλ(ω+)−vλ(ω−)
2 , so the system becomes{
(1− λ)(s(λ) + d(λ)− 1)p∗+(λ, µ) + 2(1− λ)d(λ)p+(λ, µ) = λ(1 − s(λ) − d(λ))
(1− µ)(s(µ) + d(µ)− 1)p∗+(λ, µ) + 2(1− µ)d(µ)p+(λ, µ) = µ(1 − s(µ)− d(µ))
.
When λ 6= µ the unique solution (assuming for a moment that the system is not degenerate) is given by
p+(λ, µ) =
(λ− µ)(1 − s(λ)− d(λ))(1 − s(µ)− d(µ))
2(1− λ)(1 − µ)[d(λ)(1 − s(µ))− d(µ)(1 − s(λ))](11)
p∗+(λ, µ) =
λ(1− µ)d(µ)(1 − s(λ)− d(λ)) − µ(1− λ)d(λ)(1 − s(µ)− d(µ))
(1− λ)(1− µ)[d(λ)(1 − s(µ)) − d(µ)(1 − s(λ))](12)
Similarly, considering equations (9) and (10) yields, for λ 6= µ in ]0, 116 ]
p−(λ, µ) =
(λ− µ)(1 + s(λ) − d(λ))(1 + s(µ)− d(µ))
2(1− λ)(1 − µ)[d(λ)(1 + s(µ))− d(µ)(1 + s(λ))](13)
p∗−(λ, µ) =
λ(1 − µ)d(µ)(1 + s(λ) − d(λ))− µ(1 − λ)d(λ)(1 + s(µ)− d(µ))
(1− λ)(1 − µ)[d(λ)(1 + s(µ))− d(µ)(1 + s(λ))](14)
In general there is no guarantee that the functions defined by equations (11) to (14) will be positive,
continuously extendable, or even well defined. However we now show that when they are, they define a
game in G.
Definition 5. A pair (s, d) of continuous functions from ]0, 116 ] to R is feasible if there exists a game in G
such that
vλ(ω+) = s(λ) + d(λ)
vλ(ω−) = s(λ) − d(λ).
Lemma 6. Assume that for λ 6= µ in ]0, 116], the quantities defined in equations (11) to (14) are well
defined, with value in
[
0, 12
]
. Also assume that the four functions can be continuously extended to
[
0, 116
]2
.
Then (s, d) is feasible.
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Proof. Let Γ be the stochastic game satisfying assumptions a) to d) and with transitions functions defined
by equations (11) to (14) (and their continuous extensions), by ρ(ω+|i, j, ω+) = 1−p∗+(i, j)−p+(i, j) ∈ [0, 1]
and by ρ(ω−|i, j, ω−) = 1 − p∗−(i, j)− p−(i, j) ∈ [0, 1]. It remains to show that assumption e) is satisfied,
with vλ(ω+) = s(λ)+d(λ) and vλ(ω−) = s(λ)−d(λ). By construction, for every discount factor λ equations
(3) to (6) are satisfied for i and j in
]
0, 116
] \{λ}, and so by continuity they are satisfied for i and j in[
0, 116
]
. 
3.3. Construction of a specific counterexample. To establish Theorem 4 it is thus enough to find a
couple (s, d) such that the assumptions of Lemma 6 are satisfied but s(λ) ± d(λ) does not converge as λ
goes to 0. We first give an intuition leading to our choice of specific d and s.
Let (s, d) be any feasible couple. Then, for the values not to converge, it is necessary that d(λ) tends
slowly to 0 as λ goes to 0, for the following reasons.
• Let v1 and v2 be any two accumulation points of vλ such that maxω{v1(ω) − v2(ω)} > 0. Define
Ω1 = Argmaxω{v1(ω) − v2(ω)} and Ω2 = Argmaxω∈Ω1{v1(ω)}. Reasoning as in [31] yields to a
contradiction as soon as Ω2 is a singleton ; this implies that d(λ) goes to 0 as λ goes to 0.
• Assume for example that d(λ) = 0 for λ small enough. Then vλ(ω+) = vλ(ω−), hence the values
won’t change if we replace any transition from ω+ to ω− by a transition from ω+ to ω+ ; and
any transition from ω− to ω+ by a transition from ω− to ω−. But the resulting game is just two
absorbing games played in parallel, and absorbing games have an asymptotic value, a contradiction.
If d(λ) = o(λ), the values won’t change ”much” in the auxiliary game, and the contradiction is the
same.
Denote by
√
the function x→ √x. Because of the reasons stated above, in this section we fix d = √ .
Since the payoff function is bounded, it is easy to see that if (s,
√
) is feasible and s is continuously
differentiable, then s and λs′(λ) are bounded. We now prove a reciprocal:
Proposition 7. Let6 s ∈ C1(]0, 116 ],R). Assume that s and x → xs′(x) are both bounded by 116 . Then
(s,
√
) is feasible.
Proposition 4 is an immediate consequence since there are functions s(x) satisfying the assumptions of
Proposition 7 but without a limit as x goes to 0. Take for example s(x) = sin ln x16 .
We start by a technical lemma.
Lemma 8. Let s ∈ C1(]0, 116 ],R). Assume that s and x → xs′(x) are both bounded by C. Then the two
functions defined on ]0, 116 [
2 to R by
f1(x, y) =
{√
xs(x)−√ys(y)√
x−√y if x 6= y
2xs′(x) + s(x) if x = y
and
f2(x, y) =
{√
ys(x)−√xs(y)√
x−√y if x 6= y
2xs′(x) − s(x) if x = y
are jointly continuous and bounded by 3C.
We stress out that we do not need s to have a limit, as x goes to 0, for this lemma to hold (and, in fact,
this is precisely what will allow us to construct our counterexample).
Proof. For x 6= y, f1(x, y) = (
√
x +
√
y)
√
xs(x)−√ys(y)
x−y , hence the mean value theorem ensures that f1 is
continuous. Moreover, for y < x,
|f1(x, y)| ≤ 1√
x−√y
∫ x
y
∣∣∣(√zs(z))′ ∣∣∣ dz
=
1√
x−√y
∫ x
y
∣∣∣∣√zs′(z) + s(z)2√z
∣∣∣∣ dz
≤ 1√
x−√y
∫ x
y
3Cdz
2
√
z
= 3C.
6We denote C1(A,B) the set of continuously differentiable functions from A to B.
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For x 6= y, f2(x, y) = (
√
x +
√
y)
√
xy
s(x)√
x
− s(y)√
y
x−y , hence the mean value theorem ensures that f2 is
continuous. Moreover, for y < x,
|f2(x, y)| ≤
√
xy√
x−√y
∫ x
y
∣∣∣∣∣
(
s(z)√
z
)′ ∣∣∣∣∣ dz
=
√
xy√
x−√y
∫ x
y
∣∣∣∣s′(z)√z − s(z)2z√z
∣∣∣∣ dz
≤
√
xy√
x−√y
∫ x
y
3Cdz
2z
√
z
= 3C.

For d =
√
, we remark that the quantities defined in (11) to (14) can be rewritten as, for λ 6= µ in]
0, 116
]
,
p+(λ, µ) =
(
√
λ+
√
µ)(1−√λ− s(λ))(1 −√µ− s(µ))
2(1− λ)(1 − µ)(1 + f2(λ, µ))(15)
p∗+(λ, µ) =
√
λµ
[
(1−
√
λ)(1−√µ)− f1(λ, µ) +
√
λµf2(λ, µ)
]
(1− λ)(1 − µ)(1 + f2(λ, µ))(16)
p−(λ, µ) =
(
√
λ+
√
µ)(1−
√
λ+ s(λ))(1 −√µ+ s(µ)
2(1− λ)(1 − µ)(1 − f2(λ, µ))(17)
p∗−(λ, µ) =
√
λµ
[
(1−
√
λ)(1−√µ) + f1(λ, µ)−
√
λµf2(λ, µ)
]
(1− λ)(1 − µ)(1− f2(λ, µ)) .(18)
The four following lemmas establish that the regularity conditions in Lemma 6 are satisfied under the
assumptions of Proposition 7.
Lemma 9. Let s ∈ C1(]0, 116 ],R). Assume that s and x → xs′(x) are both bounded by 116 . Then the
function defined on
[
0, 116
]2
by
p∗+(x, y) =
{√
xy[(1−
√
x)(1−√y)−f1(x,y)+√xyf2(x,y)]
(1−x)(1−y)(1+f2(x,y)) if xy > 0
0 if xy = 0
is well defined, jointly continuous, with value in
[
0, 12
]
.
Proof. Lemma 8 implies that the denominator is positive when xy > 0, hence p∗+ is well defined. The same
lemma also implies that p∗+ is jointly continuous on ]0,
1
16 ]
2. Finally, the bounds on f1 and f2 and the fact
that x and y are less than 116 imply that
√
xy
9/16− 3/16− 3/256
19/16
≤ p∗+(x, y) ≤
√
xy
1 + 3/16 + 3/256
(15/16)2 × 13/16 =
4912
2925
√
xy <
1
2
hence p∗+ is also jointly continuous at any (x, y) with xy = 0, and takes its value in
[
0, 12
]
. 
Lemma 10. Let s ∈ C1(]0, 116 ],R). Assume that s and x → xs′(x) are both bounded by 116 . Then the
function defined on
[
0, 116
]2
by
p∗−(x, y) =
{√
xy[(1−
√
x)(1−√y)+f1(x,y)−√xyf2(x,y)]
(1−x)(1−y)(1−f2(x,y)) if xy > 0
0 if xy = 0
is well defined, jointly continuous, with value in
[
0, 12
]
.
Proof. Same as the previous proof, replacing s by its opposite.
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Lemma 11. Let s ∈ C1(]0, 116 ],R). Assume that s and x → xs′(x) are both bounded by 116 . Then the
function defined on
[
0, 116
]2
by
p+(x, y) =


(
√
x+
√
y)(1−√x−s(x))(1−√y−s(y))
2(1−x)(1−y)(1+f2(x,y)) if xy > 0√
x(1−√x−s(x))
2(1−x) if x > 0 and y = 0√
y(1−√y−s(y))
2(1−y) if y > 0 and x = 0
0 if x = y = 0
is well defined, jointly continuous, with value in
[
0, 12
]
.
Proof. Lemma 8 implies that the denominator is positive when xy > 0, hence p+ is well defined. The same
lemma also implies that p+ is jointly continuous on ]0,
1
16 ]
2.
Remarking that for x 6= y , 1 + f2(x, y) = 1√x−√y (
√
x(1−√y − s(y))−√y(1−√x− s(x))) one gets
p+(x, y) =
x− y
2(1− x)(1 − y)
[ √
x
1−√x−s(x) −
√
y
1−√y−s(y)
]
hence the joint continuity of p+ at any point where xy = 0 and x+ y > 0.
Finally, the bounds on f1 and f2 and the fact that x and y are less than
1
16 imply that
(
√
x+
√
y)
(11/16)2
2× 19/16 ≤ p+(x, y) ≤ (
√
x+
√
y)
(17/16)2
2× (15/16)2 × 13/16 =
2312
2925
(
√
x+
√
y) <
1
2
hence p+ is also jointly continuous at (0, 0), and takes its value in
[
0, 12
]
. 
Lemma 12. Let s ∈ C1(]0, 116 ],R). Assume that s and x → xs′(x) are both bounded by 116 . Then the
function defined on
[
0, 116
]2
by
p−(x, y) =


(
√
x+
√
y)(1−√x+s(x))(1−√y+s(y))
2(1−x)(1−y)(1−f2(x,y)) if xy > 0√
x(1−√x+s(x))
2(1−x) if x > 0 and y = 0√
y(1−√y+s(y))
2(1−y) if y > 0 and x = 0
0 if x = y = 0
is well defined, jointly continuous, with value in
[
0, 12
]
.
Proof. Same as the previous proof, replacing the function s by its opposite. 
Proof of Proposition 7. It is an immediate consequence of Lemma 6, since by the four preceding lemmas
the functions defined by equations (11) to (14) have all the required properties. 
3.4. The case of finitely repeated stochastic game. In this section we construct examples where vn
does not converge as n goes to infinity. The idea is to construct an example in which vλ does not converge
and such that the sequence vn has the same asymptotic behavior as vλ. The following lemma is a slight
variation of a result of Neyman [18].
Lemma 13. Let Γ be any stochastic game. Assume that vλ is of class C1, and that for all ω, dvλ(ω)dλ = o( 1λ).
Then vn and vλ have the same accumulation points.
Proof. Denote wn = vλ for λ =
1
n . By assumptions and the mean value theorem,
sup
µ∈[ 1
n
, 1
n−1 ]
‖wn − vµ‖∞ = o( 1
n
).
Hence vλ and wn have the same accumulation points.
By a argument due to Neyman(Theorem 4 in [18]),
‖wn − vn‖∞ ≤ 1
n
n−1∑
i=1
i‖wi+1 − wi‖∞.
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So we only need to observe that, by the mean value theorem,
i‖wi+1 − wi‖∞ = i‖v 1
i+1
− v 1
i
‖∞
≤ 1
i+ 1
sup
λ∈[1/i,1/i+1]
∥∥∥∥dvλdλ
∥∥∥∥
∞
= o(1).

We can now prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let7 s(x) = sin ln(− ln x)16 and d(x) =
√
x. Since s′(x) = − cos ln(− ln x)16x ln x , xs′(x) is
bounded by 164 ln(2) <
1
16 , and goes to 0 as x goes to 0. By Proposition 7, (s, d) is feasible but vλ
does not converge as λ goes to 0. By Lemma 13, vn does not converge as n goes to infinity. 
Remark 14. In fact, we could prove, exactly in the same way, that for the example constructed in the last
proof, any admissible sequence zn (as defined in [30]) also diverges as n goes to infinity.
4. Concluding remarks and open problems
We first point out that these examples are minimal in several aspects:
• There are only two nonabsorbing states. Compact games with only one nonabsorbing state (called
absorbing games) have an asymptotic [24] value.
• In nonabsorbing states, the payoff does not depend on actions. If the payoff also did not depend on
the current nonabsorbing state, the game would be a compact recursive game and would have an
asymptotic value [29].
• There are exactly two initial states ω (the two absorbing states) such that vn(ω) converges. For every
compact stochastic game, there are at least two initial states such that vn(ω) converges [13, 18].
• Also remark that the action sets are not general compact sets but rather real intervals, and that all
discounted games Γλ have values in pure strategies.
At the beginning of Section 3.3 we gave necessary conditions for (s, d) to be feasible. In fact, quite
surprisingly, it turns out that those necessary conditions are almost sufficient. Explicitly, one can prove,
using the techniques presented in Section 3.3, that:
Proposition 15. Let s and d be two continuously differentiable functions from ]0, 116 ] to R. Assume that
• s and λs′(λ) are bounded.
• d is nonnegative and there exists ε > 0 such that8 for all λ ∈]0, 1],
ε ≤ λd
′(λ)
d(λ)
≤ 1− ε.
Then (As,Bd) is feasible for any nonnegative constants A and B small enough.
Let us now briefly discuss the regularity of the transitions functions in our counterexamples. One may
remark that while these functions are constructed to be continuous, they are not continuously differentiable
in 0, nor even Lipschitz-continuous. However, we affirm that this lack of regularity is not at all the reason
of the divergence of vλ. Indeed, for any nonnegative r, replacing x and y by x
r and yr in the definition of
the transition functions will not change the values (it is just a relabeling of actions) while it will regularize
the transition functions. To say it another way, we only considered games where the pure action λ is
optimal in Γλ, but this is just to make calculations easier, and relaxing this assumption we can construct
transitions as regular as one wants.
Rather than the regularity of the transition functions, we argue that the issue here is their infinite
number of oscillations. Recall that in our counterexample, p+(i, j) is of the order of
√
i+
√
j, and p∗+(i, j)
is of the order of
√
ij. Thus in Γλ, starting from ω+, Player 2 should play neither a high j (otherwise
Player 1 may absorb with payoff 1 and high probability) nor a low j (otherwise Player 1 may stay in ω+
with payoff 1 until the game is essentially finished). Hence he should play the intermediate action j = λ,
and the same thing is true in ω− and for Player 1. So, under optimal play, the order of magnitude of
the time between two transitions from a nonabsorbing state to the other is λ−
1
2 . Hence, after the first
7The function sin lnx
16
used previously would not work here since its derivative is not a o(1/x).
8In particular, any function λα for α ∈]0, 1[ satisfies this condition.
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λ−
2
3 stages (during which the accumulated discounted payoff has been negligible), there still has been
no absorption with probability almost 1, and the occupation measure has almost reached the invariant
measure p−(λ,λ)p−(λ,λ)+p+(λ,λ) · ω+ +
p+(λ,λ)
p−(λ,λ)+p+(λ,λ)
· ω−. We have thus established that the discounted payoff
given nonabsorption is approximately p−(λ,λ)−p+(λ,λ)p−(λ,λ)+p+(λ,λ) ; similarly one sees that the expected payoff after
absorption is function of the relative importance of p+, p−, p∗+ and p
∗
−. Oscillations of the ratios between
these quantities thus imply oscillations of the discounted payoff under optimal play, which is vλ. For
a compact game that is the mixed extension (up to relabelling of actions) of some finite games, these
quantities cannot oscillate infinitely often, and we think this is the reason why the values converge in
the finite framework. Since semi-algebraic functions cannot oscillate infinitely often, the following natural
question is rather intriguing:
(i) Let Γ be a compact game with semi-algebraic payoff and transition functions. Is there an asymptotic
value ?
When there is only one player, while there may be no 0-optimal play in the infinite game [2], the
asymptotic value always exists for compact games [4, 10]. In fact it exists with no hypotheses at all on the
action set as long as the number of states is finite [21]. When there are two players, the asymptotic value
exists for games with finitely many actions for each player [5], but we showed that asymptotic value may
not exist for compact games. This leads to this question in an intermediate setting:
(ii) Let Γ be a compact game in which Player 1 has a finite number of actions. Is there an asymptotic
value ?
Finally, the asymptotic value exists for compact games in which Player 2 has no influence on the
transition, and in fact even in a more general setting in which Player 2 is also not perfectly informed of the
state [22]. In our construction it is important that the transitions are jointly controlled. From ω+ Player
1 cannot ensure to go to 1∗ with positive probability, while Player 2 can force a transition to ω− with high
probability. However Player 2 cannot at the same time prevent any transition to 1∗ and ensure a positive
probability to go to ω−. Hence one may wonder:
(iii) Let Γ be a compact game in which each state is controlled by one player (but different states may
be controlled by different players). Is there an asymptotic value ?
The answer to these three questions is not know in general, however the particular case of semi algebraic
games which also satisfy either condition (ii) or (iii) is settled (with positive answer) in [8].
A last remark is that there is a huge gap between compact games with one and two nonabsorbing states.
We just showed that there is no asymptotic value for games with two nonabsorbing states ; while for one
nonabsorbing states the stronger notion of uniform value (when the payoffs are observed) also holds [16].
In fact it does not seem easy to construct a compact game with an asymptotic but no uniform value (when
the payoffs are observed).
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